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John V. Orth† 
HEN OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, then a justice of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, deliv-
ered at the dedication of a new law school build-
ing at Boston University the address that was later 
published as “The Path of the Law,” he touched upon – among many 
other topics – the then burning issue of employer liability for inju-
ries sustained by workers in the course of their employment. “It is 
conceivable,” he told his audience, “that some day in certain cases 
we may find ourselves imitating, on a higher plane, the tariff for life 
and limb which we see in the Leges Barbarorum.”1 The learned ref-
erence was to collections of customary law from the Dark Ages, 
literally the “laws of the barbarians,” that aimed to stamp out private 
vengeance by imposing on the party responsible a duty to pay the 
victim or his family a fixed amount, so much for an eye, a hand, a 
foot, etc.2 This was Holmes at his most Olympian, marking the re-
                                                                                                    
† John V. Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. This article is his seventh reappraisal in the law of property. 
1 10 HARV. L. REV. 456, 467 (1897). 
2 The Leges Barbarorum were contrasted with the Leges Romanae, the laws of the 
Romans. The earliest Anglo-Saxon legal compilation was the Laws of Ethelbert, 




semblance between barbaric law and progressive proposals to estab-
lish a cost-effective administrative system to compensate workers 
injured in industrial accidents – so much for an eye, a hand, a foot, 
etc.3 It was also Holmes at his most impish, assuring his complacent 
late-nineteenth-century listeners that if “some day” and “in certain 
cases” they ever did imitate the Leges Barbarorum, it would surely 
be “on a higher plane”! 
The need for legislation to deal with the cost of accidents was 
created by the associated common law doctrines of assumption of 
the risk and the fellow servant rule, dating from the early days of 
industrialization, which insulated employers from liability if the in-
jured worker had assumed the risk of accident in return for com-
pensation or if the proximate cause of the injury was the fault not of 
                                                                                                    
 Ethelbert’s laws are remarkable for the extraordinarily detailed sched-
ules of tariffs established for various injuries: so much for the loss of a 
leg, so much for an eye, so much if the victim was a slave, so much if he 
was a freeman, so much if he was a priest. The four front teeth were 
worth six shillings each, the teeth next to them four, the other teeth 
one; thumbs, thumbnails, forefingers, middle fingers, ring fingers, little 
fingers, and their respective fingernails were all distinguished, and a 
separate price, called a bot, was set for each. Similar distinctions were 
made among ears whose hearing was destroyed, ears cut off, ears 
pierced, and ears lacerated; among bones laid bare, bones damaged, 
bones broken, skulls broken, shoulders disabled, chins broken, collar 
bones broken, arms broken, thighs broken, and ribs broken; and among 
bruises outside the clothing, bruises under the clothing, and bruises 
which did not show black. 
 Harold Berman, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 54 (1983). James C. Carter believed that the Leges Barbarorum 
with their “tariff for life and limb” were only a specific example of a universal 
response to disorder in primitive societies. LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND 
FUNCTION 41-47 (1907). 
3 See, e.g., The North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-
31 (16) (12) (14) (providing for the loss of an eye compensation equal to “sixty-
six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages during 120 weeks”; for 
the loss of a hand, “sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages 
during 200 weeks”; for the loss of a foot, “sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the 
average weekly wages during 144 weeks”). 
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the employer but of a fellow employee.4 The rigor of the rules had 
eroded over the course of the nineteenth century as plaintiffs’ law-
yers came up with ingenious arguments to allow juries to nullify the 
rules’ effect by finding that employers were really the ones at fault 
for employing unskilled workers, failing to supply proper equip-
ment, or providing inadequate supervision.5 As Holmes knew from 
his experience on the bench at the end of the century, “in such cases 
the chance of a jury finding for the defendant [employer] is merely a 
chance, once in a while rather arbitrarily interrupting the regular 
course of recovery” by the injured worker.6 
The common law rules, the legal system’s first response to a 
problem that had ballooned in importance as the pace of industrial 
development quickened and the risk of accidents increased, were in 
need of repair or replacement. England, the home of the common 
law and the world’s first industrial nation, responded with legisla-
tion in 1897, the year Holmes spoke.7 In America, federalism led to 
a fragmented and slow-motion response, with the federal govern-
ment acting in the first decade of the twentieth century to deal with 
injuries in interstate commerce and the states slowly following 
suit with statutes dealing with injuries in local industries over the 
next four decades.8 Further complicating the process in the United 
                                                                                                    
4 Both doctrines can be traced to Farwell v. Boston & Worcester RR, 35 Mass. (4 
Metc.) 49 (1842). See also, for England, Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. 
Rep. 1030 (Exch. 1837). For a poem ridiculing the fellow servant rule, see Edgar 
Lee Masters, Butch Weldy in THE SPOON RIVER ANTHOLOGY (1915). See also John 
V. Orth, The Law in Spoon River, 16 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 301-32 (1992). 
5 See generally Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of 
Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967). 
6 10 HARV. L. REV. at 467. 
7 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37 (1897). See David G. Hanes, THE FIRST BRITISH WORKMEN’S 
COMPENSATION ACT, 1897 (1968). 
8 Act of June 11, 1906, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (Federal Employers’ Liability Act) 
(FELA) (carriers in interstate commerce liable to employees for injuries caused by 
defective equipment or negligent supervision), amended by acts of April 22, 1908 
(ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65) and April 5, 1910 (ch. 143, 36 Stat. 291). Beginning with 
New York in 1910, thirty-seven states had passed workmen’s compensation statutes 
by 1917. In 1948 Mississippi became the last state to adopt a workmen’s compensa-
John V. Orth 
68  10 GREEN BAG 2D 
States was the need for legislation to run the gauntlet of judicial re-
view, with several early workers’ compensation statutes being held 
unconstitutional.9 
The pattern of rule and reaction is not limited to the law’s re-
sponse to the problem of liability for industrial accidents. It repeats 
as the passage of time reveals dissatisfaction with results in other 
situations, whether because of deeper analysis, accumulated experi-
ence, or the force of contrary opinion. No area of the law offers 
more examples than property law because of its extraordinary lon-
gevity. For centuries, while torts and criminal law were underde-
veloped and contract law was most noticeable by its absence, prop-
erty law was elaborated by an intricate interaction of developing 
caselaw and interfering legislation. One of the first statutes in the 
English lawbook, De Donis Conditionalibus (1285),10 the root of 
the fee tail, was enacted to overturn a line of common law deci-
sions. The oldest treatise on English property law was Littleton’s 
Tenures from about 1481, greatly elaborated by Sir Edward Coke’s 
commentaries more than a century later,11 while the first English 
book on contracts would not appear for more than three hundred 
                                                                                                    
tion statute. Latterly the name of the statutes has been changed, in the interest of 
gender-neutrality, to Worker’s Compensation Act. E.g., N.C. Sess. Laws 1979, 
c. 714, § 1. 
9 Employers’ Liability Case, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) (holding 1906 FELA unconstitutional 
because it applied to intrastate as well as to interstate carriers); Employers’ Liability 
Case, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (upholding FELA as amended); Ives v. South Buffalo Railway 
Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1911) (holding N.Y. Workmen’s Compensation 
Act unconstitutional for violation of the due process clauses of state and federal 
constitutions); New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (upholding Act 
reenacted after amendment of N.Y. Constitution). 
10 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285). For its background and subsequent history, see John V. 
Orth, Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 773-
78 (1988). 
11 Edward Coke, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON (1628). Following the pattern 
established by the four books of Justinian’s Institutiones, comprehensive treatments 
of law were commonly divided into four books or “institutes.” Coke on Littleton – 
cited by generations of lawyers as Co. Litt. – is also known as the First Institute. 
Coke’s Second, Third, and Fourth Institutes were published posthumously in 1641. 
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years,12 and treatises on tort law were delayed more than sixty years 
after that.13 
The joint tenancy and its associated right of survivorship, dating 
from the thirteenth century, functioned as a will substitute in a 
world before wills. Originally intended to keep estates intact to fa-
cilitate the collection of feudal incidents, the joint tenancy was actu-
ally used to subvert that purpose by facilitating the development of 
feoffments to uses, separating the legal title (held by feoffees in joint 
tenancy) from the equitable title of the beneficiaries. So widespread 
was this practice that it came to be assumed that grants to two or 
more were intended to be in joint tenancy, rather than in tenancy in 
common. Abolition of the feudal incidents eliminated the need to 
avoid them, but by then the use (or, as it was then coming to be 
called, the trust) had proved its utility in other ways. The presump-
tion in favor of joint tenancy had outlived its purpose and became 
instead a trap for the unwary.14 Without the advice of a skilled con-
veyancer, grantees could end up with an estate whose operation 
they did not understand and whose results they did not want – “a 
manifest injustice,” as the North Carolina General Assembly put it 
in 1784, “to the families of such as happen to die first.”15 
The common law’s response was characteristically devious: ap-
plying a relaxed presumption in wills as opposed to deeds16 and, as 
to the latter, strictly applying the technical requirements of the so-
                                                                                                    
12 John Joseph Powell, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS 
(1790). See P.S. Atiyah, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103 
(1979). 
13 Francis Hilliard, THE LAW OF TORTS (1859). See G. Edward White, TORT LAW IN 
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 4 (1985); S.F.C. Milsom, A NATURAL 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 13 (2003). 
14 See John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law, Plus ça Change …, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 173-80 
(2002). 
15 Act of 1784, ch. 22, § 6, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH 
CAROLINA 574 (Walter Clark ed. 1904). 




called four unities to avoid the application of the presumption.17 The 
final remedy was legislative. States that confronted the issue first, 
such as North Carolina and Pennsylvania, abolished the right of sur-
vivorship as an incident of joint tenancies,18 while states that dealt 
with the issue later, such as Illinois and Iowa, discovered a simpler 
solution: reverse the presumption.19 The second legislative thought 
was better than the first. There was no reason not to allow the crea-
tion of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship if the parties knew 
what they were getting into and wanted it. States in the first group 
eventually caught up, Pennsylvania by a fairly prompt judicial gloss 
that the statute only applied in the absence of clearly expressed in-
tention to the contrary, North Carolina by an amendment to the 
statute two centuries later.20 
Wills law provides some of the best examples of second, third, 
and more thoughts on the most expedient rule. A creature of stat-
ute, not of the common law, the will first became possible with the 
adoption of the Wills Act of 1540.21 Indicative of the complex inter-
action of statute and common law that would follow, experience 
over more than a century with evidentiary problems led to further 
legislation. The Statute of Frauds, best known today for its provi-
sions concerning contracts, had a section on wills that required, in 
quaint fashion, a writing with “three or four credible witnesses,”22 
                                                                                                    
17 Although really a description of the nature rather than the creation of the joint 
tenancy, the Doctrine of the Four Unities – that joint tenants must at all times 
have “one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, com-
mencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided pos-
session,” id. at 180 – could function in the hands of an astute judge as a screen to 
prevent the recognition of unwanted joint tenancies by finding some defect in the 
unities. 
18 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-2; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 110. 
19 765 ILCS 1005/1; Iowa Code Ann. § 557.15. 
20 Arnold v. Jack’s Executors, 24 Pa. 57 (1854). See John V. Orth, The Joint Tenancy 
Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 491 (1991) (describing 
amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-2). 
21 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1 (1540). 
22 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 5 (1676). 
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the germ of the modern written attested will. Applying standard 
common law rules on witness competency, the courts then pro-
ceeded to invalidate wills witnessed by persons benefiting as devi-
sees or legatees in the will. To remedy this, in 1752 parliament in 
turn adopted the so-called purging statute, widely copied in Ameri-
can states.23 Drafted on the assumption that the testator’s primary 
intention was that the will be valid, the statute saved it by purging 
interested witnesses (and their spouses) of their interests. Thus was 
the will saved, but oftentimes at the expense of invalidating the very 
gifts that had been its primary purpose. New legislation was re-
quired and is today slowly making its way through the state legisla-
tures.24 
Wills are delayed-action documents, executed one day to be ef-
fective later, often much later, when the testator dies.25 What if the 
testator’s situation changes but the will remains the same? At com-
mon law, subsequent marriage and the birth of issue revoked the 
will.26 The rationale was that the ordinary testator would want in 
such circumstances to make new provisions, that failure to do so 
                                                                                                    
23 25 Geo. 2, ch. 6, § 1 (1752). E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 191, § 2; N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 31-10. 
24 E.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 6112 (allowing interested witnesses but raising a rebut-
table presumption that their devises were procured by duress, menace, fraud, or 
undue influence). See also Uniform Probate Code § 2-505 (1990) (accepting inter-
ested witness as competent). 
25 Wills are said to be “ambulatory,” that is, inoperative until the testator’s death; in 
consequence, they are capable of disposing of property acquired after execution. 
The same characteristic is referred to in the Bible: “For where a testament is, 
there must also of necessity be the death of the testator. / For a testament is of 
force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator 
liveth.” Heb. 9: 16-17 (KJV). 
26 2 Bl. Com. 502. Indeed, the common law went further: any change in testator’s 
circumstances could revoke the devise. For a survey of the cases, see 4 James 
Kent, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 528-31 (12th ed. by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, 1873). Lord Mansfield criticized these results and announced his opinion 
that “constructive revocations, contrary to the intention of the testator, ought not 
to be indulged; and that some over-strained resolutions of that sort had brought a 
scandal upon the law.” Swift v. Roberts, 3 Burr. 1488, 1491, 97 Eng. Rep. 941, 
942-43 (K.B. 1764).  
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was most likely the result of inattention, and that in such cases the 
results produced by the canons of descent (that is, by intestate suc-
cession) would probably be preferable to the unamended will. That 
went too far for some and legislation was adopted: subsequent mar-
riage alone should be sufficient.27 But then, why should the law re-
voke the will at all? Why not provide for an “overlooked” spouse in 
other ways? So pretermitted spouse statutes were adopted, reserv-
ing a share of the estate for the spouse but otherwise leaving the will 
in effect.28 
Divorce (like the will itself) was unknown to the common law, 
so divorce had no necessary effect on wills. But what if a testator 
died leaving unchanged a will with provision for a now ex-spouse? 
Again it was difficult to imagine that the ordinary testator intended 
this result. Legislation ensued, revoking such testamentary disposi-
tions.29 But what about gifts to the relatives of ex-spouses, such as 
former in-laws or step-children? And what about provisions in favor 
of ex-spouses in all those proliferating means to pass property at 
death, “will substitutes” like revocable trusts, pay-on-death con-
tracts, joint and survivor accounts? More legislation.30 
What if a will beneficiary dies before the will becomes effective 
at the death of the testator? Gifts inter vivos or testamentary cannot 
be given to the dead, so the gift lapses, that is, fails. But is that the 
correct inference to draw from a testator’s failure to provide a sub-
stitutionary gift in the original will or to add a codicil taking account 
of the change caused by the death? Legislation was adopted to pre-
vent the effect of the lapse of a gift to a named individual but only if 
the individual was closely related to the testator and died leaving 
issue.31 In the case of a gift to a class, such as a gift to “grandchil-
                                                                                                    
27 E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-257. 
28 E.g., Fla. Stat. § 732.301. See also Uniform Probate Code § 2-301 (1990, as 
amended 1993). 
29 E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-5.4. 
30 See Uniform Probate Code § 2-804 (1990, as amended 1997) (revoking gifts by 
will or will substitute to relatives of ex-spouse as well as to ex-spouse). 
31 E.g., Tex. Probate Code Ann. § 68. 
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dren,” the common law had provided a sort of anti-lapse protection 
by providing for distribution among any surviving class members. 
As the number of class members got smaller, the potential share of 
each got bigger until final distribution at the testator’s death. Was 
this what the testator likely intended? Or should the anti-lapse stat-
ute be amended to apply in the case of class gifts as well? More legis-
lation.32 
The list could be extended with examples of other attempts in-
volving repeated legislative efforts to effectuate presumed intent in 
cases in which a testator failed to make express provision – statutes 
concerning pretermitted children,33 ademption by extinction,34 
ademption by satisfaction35 – although not all gaps are filled. And in 
some cases deliberately so; that is, in some cases the testator’s actual 
intention is known, not merely presumed, but crossed nonetheless. 
The right of survivorship associated with the joint tenancy can be 
severed by inter vivos conveyance of an undivided share, but not by 
provision in a will, no matter how plainly expressed. As one re-
spected casebook puts it: 
A large number of joint tenants select the tenancy precisely 
because of the high degree of assurance that there will be no 
entanglement with probate. To continue this assurance, the 
right of testamentary disposition must be denied, and the 
                                                                                                    
32 E.g., 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 83 (adding to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-42(a) “In the case 
of the class devise, the issue shall take whatever share the deceased devisee would 
have taken had the devisee survived the testator” the words “in the event the de-
ceased class member leaves no issue, the devisee’s share shall devolve upon the 
members of the class who survived the testator and the issue of any deceased 
members taking by substitution”). 
33 E.g., Fla. Stat. § 732.302; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-5.5. See Uniform Probate Code 
§ 2-302 (1990, as amended 1993). Like pretermitted spouses, pretermitted chil-
dren are those born after the execution of a will and left unprovided for. 
34 E.g., Uniform Probate Code § 2-606 (1990, as amended 1997). Ademption refers 
to those situations in which the subject of a specific gift indicated in a will is absent 
from the estate at testator’s death, either because it was parted with inter vivos 
(ademption by extinction) or because it was given during life to the intended 
donee (ademption by satisfaction). 
35 E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-24. 
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few attempts by ignorant testators to devise their part of 
joint tenancy property must fail.36 
The juridical conscience is salved by the thought that such attempts 
are “few” and the disappointed testators “ignorant,” so the frustra-
tion of clearly expressed intention is not so barbaric after all. 
What should be the result if a married person deliberately ex-
cludes a spouse from the provisions of a will? The common law’s 
solution to the problem of providing for the surviving spouse 
(whether there was a will or not) was dower for the widow and 
curtesy for the widower. Dower was a life estate in one-third of all 
estates of freehold of which the husband was seized during the mar-
riage,37 while curtesy was a life estate in all the estates of freehold of 
which the wife was seized during the marriage, but only on condi-
tion that live issue had been produced.38 For obvious reasons neither 
estate was convenient except in situations of large and stable land-
ownership, the common law’s presumed original position. Even 
then, both were routinely avoided by private arrangements in the 
form of strict settlements.  
In modern times curtesy was eliminated and dower extended to 
both sexes, but this eventually proved unsatisfactory. At last, even 
the old name was erased, replaced by a statutory elective share, 
granting the surviving spouse the right to demand a portion of the 
decedent’s estate. At first applicable only to property passing by 
will, the elective share has been progressively but unevenly ex-
tended to property passing outside the will by various will substi-
tutes. Constantly tinkered with by further legislation in an effort to 
afford more perfect equity and now exhibiting a bewildering array 
of forms in various states, the modern elective share defies generali-
zation – so much so that one widely used casebook posts a promi-
nent warning: “Caution. There is no subject in this book on which 
there is more statutory variation than the surviving spouse’s elective 
                                                                                                    
36 Jesse Dukeminier et al., WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 345 (7th ed. 2005). 
37 2 Bl. Com. 129. 
38 Id. at 126. For an historical explanation of why curtesy was greater than dower, 
see S.F.C. Milsom, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 60-61 (2003). 
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share.”39 The operation of federal tax law has actually prompted a 
revival of life interests for surviving spouses, usually widows, in the 
form of “qualified terminal interest property,” QTIP for short, lead-
ing one scholar to describe it as “the new federal law of dower”40 – a 
return, if not to the laws of the barbarians, at least to the laws of the 
Middle Ages. 
And what should be the result if a person named in a will mur-
ders the testator? It is difficult to imagine a testator intending the 
gift under such circumstances. And public policy seems to demand 
that the wrongdoer be deprived of the benefit. “No one should 
profit from his own wrong.”41 But can this untoward result be pre-
vented by common law, or is legislation required? Experience with 
the so-called slayer statutes has revealed a host of problems. What is 
to be done with the gift to the murderer? What if the crime was 
manslaughter rather than homicide? What if no prosecution is possi-
ble because the murder was immediately followed by the suicide of 
the murderer? – in which case no earthly profit is at issue. What of 
so-called “mercy killings” in which the “victim” requests death at the 
hands of a loved one in order to shorten a lingering and painful 
death? And what about will substitutes benefiting the murderer? 
Particular problems arise with the application of the slayer statutes 
to joint tenancies with right of survivorship since the theory of the 
joint tenancy, which long predated the Wills Act, does not concep-
                                                                                                    
39 Dukeminier et al., WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES at 425. 
40 Mary M. Wenig, Taxing Marriage, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 561 
(1997). 
41 Cal. Civ. Code § 3517 (“No one can take advantage of his own wrong.”); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 31A-15 (“no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong.”). 
See also the celebrated common law case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 
22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889) (“No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, 
or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniq-
uity, or to acquire property by his own crime.”); Ronald Dworkin, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23 (1978) (discussing Riggs). 
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tualize the effect of the death of one joint tenant as passing any in-
terest to the survivor. More and still more legislation.42 
Second and subsequent thoughts are not unique to the legisla-
ture. The judiciary too regularly rethinks the law, although it is 
somewhat harder to observe. Part of the problem is the slippery 
nature of the common law itself. Although it originated in England 
centuries ago, the common law is domesticated in America. “The 
common law of England,” Justice Joseph Story declared on behalf of 
the United States Supreme Court in 1829, “is not to be taken in all 
respects to be that of America.”43 And, a few years later, he added 
that the decisions of courts concerning the common law “are often 
reexamined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves, 
whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or 
otherwise incorrect.”44 
Early in the twentieth century, in an apparent attempt to stabi-
lize the common law and perhaps insulate it from further legislative 
meddling, the legal establishment commenced the project that re-
sulted in the monumental Restatements of the Law. Although the 
project seemed to call only for the reduction to black letter of the 
basic common law rules, the Restaters did not confine themselves to 
stating (or “restating”) whatever rule was applied by the majority of 
courts but chose instead the rule they judged best. The adoption of 
minority rules made the Restatements a vehicle for legal innova-
tion,45 and the Restaters became, like poets, “unacknowledged legis-
                                                                                                    
42 E.g., 84 Okla. Stat. Supp. 1975 § 231 (effective June 12, 1975) (amending slayer 
statute to prohibit slayer from “receiv[ing] any interest in the estate of the victim 
…, or as a surviving joint tenant”). 
43 Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829). 
44 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1834). For an essay reflecting on the 
consequences of this view of the common law operating within a system governed 
by a written constitution, see John V. Orth, Can the Common Law Be Unconstitu-
tional?, in HOW MANY JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A SUPREME COURT? AND 
OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION ch. 3 (2006). 
45 See David Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared 
History – Part III: British and American Real Property Law and Practice – A Contemporary 
Comparison, 34 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 443, 479 (1999). 
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lators.”46 Having themselves had second thoughts about some settled 
doctrines, the first Restaters unintentionally invited still further 
thoughts.47 The result has been Second and even Third Restate-
ments, as later generations of Restaters think yet again. 
 
hortly after Holmes delivered his oration at Boston University, 
the eminent lawyer James C. Carter prepared lectures for deliv-
ery at the Harvard Law School, the culmination of his lifelong cam-
paign against legislative codification of the common law. Concluding 
his survey of law’s “origin, growth, and function,” Carter compla-
cently announced: 
We now come to the last stage in our inquiry concerning 
what has actually governed the conduct of men in society. 
This is the stage of full enlightenment, such as is exhibited 
in Europe and the United States at the present day … .48 
This fatuous statement is simply an unguarded expression of a sen-
timent that is (and always has been) current in some circles, mainly 
academic: the belief that after their second or third or more thought 
the final thought would have been thought. 
The point, of course, is not that our law should become like that 
of the Medes and the Persians, which, if the Bible is to be taken lit-
erally, “changeth not.”49 There is no reason not to think again and 
                                                                                                    
46 See Percy Bysshe Shelley, A DEFENSE OF POETRY (1821) (“Poets are the unac-
knowledged legislators of the world.”). 
47 See Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 67 (1974) (asking “Why should 
there be a second series of Restatements?”). 
48 James C. Carter, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION 66 (1907). For 
repeated references to “the present enlightened age,” see id. at 115, 119. Intended 
for delivery in early 1905, the lectures were never actually delivered because of 
Carter’s untimely death. For Carter’s place in American legal history, see Bernard 
Schwartz, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 337-46 (“James C. 
Carter: Written Law – ‘Victorious upon Paper and Powerless Elsewhere’”); 353-
63 (“Legal Thought in Action: Carter versus Field”) (1993).  




again about improving the existing rules, while at the same time 
recognizing the value of stability. What really deserves a second 
thought is the notion that at the next meeting (or perhaps the one 
after that) of the particular drafting committee, whether of state 
legislators or of academic experts, the last stage of “full enlighten-
ment” will have been reached. 
What history teaches is not some simple and simply applied rule 
for future behavior, nor is it only the clichéd notion that “everything 
changes,” or, as Carter would have put it, “progresses.” Instead, by 
showing with specificity how things have changed – how often, how 
incompletely, how ultimately unsatisfactorily they have changed – 
history informs our thoughts about future change and leads us to 
abandon the pursuit of the ignis fatuus of full enlightenment. Some-
thing Holmes said earlier about consistency in the law is also true of 
the quest for legal perfection: 
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never 
reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles 
from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from his-
tory at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or 
sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it 
ceases to grow.50 
What deserves another thought, in other words, is the thought that 




                                                                                                    
50 Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 32 (1881). 
